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Abstract
This paper builds on the work of Degond, Herty and Liu in [16] by considering N -player
stochastic differential games. The control corresponding to a Nash equilibrium of such a
game is approximated through model predictive control (MPC) techniques. In the case of a
linear quadratic running-cost, considered here, the MPC method is shown to approximate
the solution to the control problem by the best reply strategy (BRS) for the running cost.
We then compare the MPC approach when taking the mean field limit with the popular
mean field game (MFG) strategy. We find that our MPC approach reduces the two coupled
PDEs to a single PDE, greatly increasing the simplicity and tractability of the original
problem. We give two examples of applications of this approach to previous literature and
conclude with future perspectives for this research.
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1 Introduction
Mean field game (MFG) models were first proposed by Lasry and Lions [35–37] and simultane-
ously by Huang, Caines and Malhame´ [25–29]. Their research follows from the previous work
of Aumann [6] and related researchers [38, 41] on systems with a continuum of agents. In the
last decade, the field has grown considerably with research taking many different directions –
from applications [30,32,34], to existence, uniqueness and regularity [7,12,15], and to numerical
analysis [1–3]. The aim of MFG models is to describe how populations of agents evolve over
time due to their strategic interactions. The trajectories of agents are determined through the
minimisation of a cost functional over long time horizons. This process of optimisation implicitly
assumes agents consider the future evolution of the population for long time periods and are able
to continuously change their control.
For a large number of applications, such as firm behaviour, traffic and pedestrian dynamics, and
other human-based optimisation processes, this type of decision-making strategy seems to be
different to reality. It would be more likely that in such applications, agents fix their control
over a short period of time, evolve their position and then update the control. In recent years,
another model of agent interaction has been developed – that of the ‘best reply strategy’ (BRS).
The BRS was used in [19] to describe agents whose strategies evolved on a faster time scale than
their social configuration. It was applied, in [17] and [18] respectively, to the evolution of wealth
in conservative and non-conservative economies. In a later paper by Degond, Herty and Liu [16],
it was shown that the BRS could be related to a rescaled mean field game model in the case of
deterministic dynamics.1
This relationship was described by a discretisation of the MFG, using a method of control known
as model predictive control (MPC) or receding horizon control. The MPC method is detailed
in [24] and the references therein. In this paper we extend the work in [16] to include idiosyncratic
noise in individual dynamics and a terminal cost in the optimisation functional. In a similar
manner to [16], figure 1 can explain how we relate the BRS to MFGs via the MPC approach.
The description of the dynamics begins with an N -player stochastic differential game (top left
box in figure 1). We then have a choice of either using MPC to take us to the BRS for the
N -player games (top right box) or we can take the number players to infinity to obtain the MFG
(bottom left box). The two methods then converge to the mean field BRS (bottom right box)
either by using MPC from the MFG or taking the limit as the number of players go to infinity
from the BRS for the N -player game.
This paper is laid out as follows. In Section 2 we describe the setup of the N -player stochastic
differential game; we use two methods to explain how the MPC approach results in the BRS. We
then take a mean field limit of the controlled N -player dynamics to obtain the mean field BRS.
In Section 3 we develop the MFG related to the N -player stochastic differential game by taking
the number of players to infinity. We then show how the MPC approach can be used to recover
the mean field BRS from the MFG. In Section 4 we take a number of examples from the MFG
and BRS literature and redesign them in the paradigm of this paper as examples for both how
this approach might simplify numerical calculations and how the current BRS literature can be
considered under the MFG paradigm. In Section 5 we summarise our results and explain future
directions for research, both in terms of applications and theory. Finally, in the Appendix we
define and discuss various notions of differentiability in the space of measures.
1It should be noted that the rescaling doesn’t necessarily preserve the nash equilibrium of the original MFG
model, so while this relation is important in understanding the transition from MFG to BRS, the resulting BRS
dynamics can’t be expected to approximate the nash equilibria of the original MFG model in general.
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Figure 1: Schematic diagram describing the links between N -player games, maen field games
and model predictive control.
2 Model predictive control of large interacting systems
and the best reply strategy
2.1 An N-player stochastic differential game
Consider N players labelled by i = 1, . . . , N . Each player has a state Xi ∈ Rd, which they are
controlling over a time horizon of [0, T ]. Throughout the entire paper, N denotes the number of
players in the game, d denotes the dimension of the state space, i, j ∈ {1, . . . N} denotes the ith
or jth player, and finally k ∈ {1, . . . d} denotes the kth component of a player’s state. We denote
by Xj,k ∈ R the kth component of player j’s state, by Xj = (Xj,k)k ∈ Rd player j’s state, by
X = (Xj)j = ((Xj,k)k)j ∈ RNd the total state of the system and by X−i = (Xj)j 6=i ∈ R(N−1)d
the state of the system without player i. This convention will be similarly used for other variables
or functions, unless otherwise stated.
We assume that each player’s dynamics are influenced by the state of the entire system. This
influence is interpreted as a function f
(N)
i : R
Nd → Rd. We also assume that each player
can control their dynamics with a control ui : [0, T ] → Rd. Finally, we include a randomness
to the dynamics depending on time and a player’s own position, this is given by the function
σ : [0, T ] × Rd → diag(Rd), where diag(Rd) is the set of diagonal d × d matrices. Player i’s
dynamics can therefore be summarised by
dXi(t) = (f
(N)
i (X(t)) + ui(t))dt+ σ(t,Xi(t))dBi(t)
Xi(0) = X
0
i .
(2.1)
Here, Bi(t) are independent d-dimensional Wiener processes with t ∈ [0, T ] and the initial condi-
tion, X0i , are given iid random variables for all i = 1, . . . , N . We assume that each player wants
to minimise its own objective functional.
Definition 2.1. Given a set of admissable controls A, from which players choose their strategies,
we define the objective functional, Ji : AN → R for player i as the cost of player i’s trajectory
when controls u = (ui)i : [0, T ]→ RNd are used, i.e.
3
Ji(u) = E
[∫ T
0
(
αi(s)
2
|ui(s)|2+h(N)i (X(s))
)
ds+ g
(N)
i (X(T ))
]
. (2.2)
The objective functional’s constituent parts are: the running cost of being in position x, given
by h
(N)
i (x); the terminal cost of ending up in position x at the end of the control horizon, given
by g
(N)
i (x); and the running cost
αi(s)
2 |ui(s)|2 which is used to penalise the size of the control
function. Therefore, each player is choosing a strategy to minimise this objective functional, as
in [37], this corresponds to a Nash equilibrium where no player can reduce their cost any further
by changing their strategy only. We denote the optimal strategy for player i by u∗i . It is then
given by the following minimisation problem
Ji(u
∗) = min
ui∈A
Ji(ui, u
∗
−i) ∀i = 1, . . . , N. (2.3)
We assume agents can choose controls from a certain set A of admissable controls. This set
usually consists of progressively measurable controls with constraints on their smoothness and
integrability. In the finite-player case, we assume that we are using closed-loop controls i.e. that
for each i there is a deterministic function φi : [0, T ]× RNd×RNd → R such that
ui(t) = φi(t,X0, Xt). (2.4)
For a discussion on different sets of admissable controls as well as requirements on the various
functions f
(N)
i , h
(N)
i , g
(N)
i , αi, see Chapter 2 of [20]. As an example of such results, we can ensure
existence of solutions to the SDE/optimisation problem (2.1) and (2.3) if the following hold:
• f (N)i is Lipschitz, locally bounded and continuously differentiable and and f (N)i (X(t)) is
L2 bounded in time for any control ui.
• σ is Lipschitz, locally bounded and continuously differentiable in x and σ(t,Xi(t)) is L2
bounded in time for any control ui.
• g(N)i is locally bounded, continuously differentiable with a derivative that has at most linear
growth and convex.
• h(N)i is locally bounded and continuously differentiable with a derivative that has at most
linear growth
• αi(t) > 0.
These requirements guarantee the convexity of each optimisation problem and the existence of
solutions to the SDE when using the optimal strategy.
We also introduce the following definition of player i’s value functional. This is closely related
to the objective functional (2.2) and is used in the description of the optimal strategies
Definition 2.2. We define the value functional, Vi = Vi(t, x) : [0, T ]× RNd → R for player i as
the cost of player i’s trajectory from time t to T , with agents starting at position x, using their
optimal controls. i.e.
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Vi(t, x) = E
[∫ T
t
(
αi(s)
2
|u∗i (s)|2+h(N)i (X(s))
)
ds+ g
(N)
i (X(T ))
]
, (2.5)
where X(s) solves (2.1) with control u∗ and initial condition X(t) = x. Note that in this
definition x ∈ RNd is a deterministic initial condition.
As well as the optimal strategy u∗i , this paper is interested in the potentially sub-optimal strategy,
denoted by u¯i, know as the best reply strategy (BRS). The reason for interest in this is its ease
of computation and that in certain situations it may be a better modelling paradigm for agent
behaviour than a mean field game.
Definition 2.3. For dynamics given by (2.1), and an instantaneous cost function Φi(X(t)), the
best reply strategy is given by
u¯i = −∇xiΦi(X(t)) . (2.6)
2.2 Two methods for BRS dynamics of the N-player game
We now use the MPC approach, as explained in [4], [16] and [39], to simplify the stochastic
dynamic game model. This is done through two methods, the first discretises (2.5) to find an
approximate optimal control, while the second discretises the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation related to (2.5). As will be seen at the end of this subsection, both methods yield the
same BRS control and hence the choice is an arbitrary one to make. Under the MPC approach,
we start by assuming that agents only control their behaviour in a piecewise constant manner
i.e. ui =
∑n
l=1 u
l
i 1[(l−i)∆t,l∆t)(t), where u
l
i ∈ Rd, and ∆t = Tn , for some n ∈ N. This reflects
the idea that agents do not have continuous control over their dynamics, rather they choose a
control for a short time horizon, their dynamics evolve and then they choose a new control. This
leads us to
E
[∫ T
0
(
αi(s)
2
|ui(s)|2+h(N)i (X(s))
)
ds+ g
(N)
i (X(T ))
]
=
n∑
l=1
E
[∫ l∆t
(l−1)∆t
(
αi(s)
2
|ui|2+h(N)i (X(s))
)
ds+
∆t
T
g
(N)
i (X(T ))
]
(2.7)
We then assume that rather than optimising over the whole time period, each expectation inside
the sum in (2.7) is optimised at time l∆t, so
E
[∫ l∆t
(l−1)∆t
(
αi(s)
2
|ui|2+h(N)i (X(s))
)
ds+
∆t
T
g
(N)
i (X(T ))
]
≈ E
[∫ l∆t
(l−1)∆t
(
αi(s)
2
|ui|2+h(N)i (X(s))
)
ds+
∆t
T
g
(N)
i (X(l∆t))
]
. (2.8)
The second approximation is correct up to order O(∆t).
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Remark. We are interested in the approximation of controls over each small time period of size
∆t, hence why it is important that in each term the approximation is correct up to order O(∆t).
From a modelling perspective this would be appropriate in situations where the anticipation of
agents is low relative to the length of the time horizon. Of course this will result in a sub-optimal
control as the sum of the errors results in an error of order O(1), therefore we cannot necessarily
expect the resulting BRS control to approximate the Nash equilibrium control.
As a result, we may restrict ourselves to the case of considering the dynamics (2.1) and control
problem (2.3) on the time horizon [t, t+ ∆t]. In order for the cost (2.5) to make sense over such
short time horizons, we scale it by 1∆t . Therefore, under our paradigm, agents are optimising
the following expectation over ui : Ω → Rd, where Ω is the underlying probability space of the
SDE (2.1).
V ∆ti (t, x;u) = E
[∫ t+∆t
t
(
αi(s)
2∆t
|ui|2+ 1
∆t
h
(N)
i (X(s))
)
ds+
1
T
g
(N)
i (X(t+ ∆t))
]
. (2.9)
Where X(t) = x and players are using controls u.
Method 1:
Using a Riemann sum, specifically the end point quadrature rule, to approximate the integral
(2.9) up to order O(∆t), we get
u∗i = arg min
ui:Ω→Rd
E
[
h
(N)
i (X(t+ ∆t)) +
αi(t+ ∆t)
2
|ui|2+ 1
T
g
(N)
i (X(t+ ∆t))
]
, i = 1, . . . , N.
(2.10)
Using Itoˆ’s formula for h
(N)
i at time t and the notation Dxj := (∂xj,k)k, D
2
xj := (∂xj,kxj,l)k,l gives
dh
(N)
i (X(t)) =
=
N∑
j=1
(
(f
(N)
j (X(t)) + uj(t)) ·Dxjh(N)i (X(t)) +
1
2
Tr
(
σ2(t,Xj(t))D
2
xjh
(N)
i (X(t))
))
dt
+
N∑
j=1
σ(t, (Xj(t))Dxjh
(N)
i (X(t)) · dBj(t), (2.11)
and similarly for the Itoˆ expansion of g
(N)
i (X(t + ∆t)). We then use an Euler-Maruyama dis-
cretisation, a simple extension of the Euler discretisation of an ODE to the setting of SDEs (for
more information see [33]), of the dynamics (2.1) on (t, t+ ∆t) with an initial value X¯ = X(t).
We take ∆Bi(t) = Bi(t+ ∆t)−Bi(t), then take the expectation to get the following weak order
O(∆t) approximation of u∗i .
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u∗i = arg min
ui:Ω→Rd
E
(h(N)i + 1T g(N)i )(X¯) +
N∑
j=1
(f
(N)
j (X¯) ·Dxj (h(N)i +
1
T
g
(N)
i )(X¯)∆t

+ E
 N∑
j=1
Tr
(
σ2(t, X¯j)D
2
xj (h
(N)
i +
1
T
g
(N)
i )(X¯)
)
∆t

+ E
 N∑
j=1, j 6=i
uj(t) ·Dxj (h(N)i +
1
T
g
(N)
i )(X¯)∆t

+ E
[
ui ·Dxi(h(N)i +
1
T
g
(N)
i )(X¯)∆t+
αi(t+ ∆t)
2
|ui|2
]
.
(2.12)
Notice that only the final term in (2.12) depends on ui, so this can be simplified to
u∗i = arg min
ui:Ω→Rd
E
[(
ui ·Dxi(h(N)i +
1
T
g
(N)
i )(X¯) +
αi(t+ ∆t)
2∆t
|ui|2
)]
. (2.13)
Note that, in general, for some functional F = F(ω, u(ω)) : Ω× Rd → R we have
min
u(ω):Ω→Rd
E[F(ω, u(ω))] = min
u(ω)
∫
Ω
F(ω, u(ω))dP (ω). (2.14)
Now, suppose the function u∗(ω) satisfies F(ω, u∗(ω)) = minu∈RF(ω, u) for all ω. Then for any
other process u(ω), we necessarily have
F(ω, u∗(ω)) ≤ F(ω, u(ω)). (2.15)
Integrating over Ω and taking the minimum with respect to u(ω) gives
min
u:Ω→R
E[F(ω, u(ω))] = E[F(ω, u∗(ω))] (2.16)
Thus, applying this reasoning to (2.13), it is clear that the expectation in (2.13) will be minimised
if for every ω ∈ Ω the following expression is minimised
(
ui(ω) ·Dxi(h(N)i +
1
T
g
(N)
i )(X¯) +
αi(t+ ∆t)
2∆t
|ui(ω)|2
)
(2.17)
Now, we fix ω ∈ Ω so that u∗i = u∗i (ω) ∈ R is some constant in R to be found. We can use first
order conditions to find u∗i . Approximating αi(t+ ∆t) by a Taylor expansion of order O(∆t) we
get
u∗i = −
∆t
αi(t) + ∆tα˙i(t)
Dxi(h
(N)
i +
1
T
g
(N)
i )(X¯). (2.18)
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If we were to take the limit ∆t→ 0, we would get u∗i = − 1α˙i(t)Dxi(h
(N)
i +
1
T g
(N)
i )(X(t)), however
in many situations we may take αi as constant, so this control would make no sense. To rectify
this problem we have to rescale αi by ∆t, redefining V
∆t
i as
V ∆ti (t, x;u) = E
[∫ t+∆t
t
(
αi(s)
2
|ui|2+ 1
∆t
h
(N)
i (X(s))
)
ds+
1
T
g
(N)
i (X(t+ ∆t))
]
. (2.19)
If we do this and go through the same process as above we get
u∗i = −
1
αi(t) + ∆tα˙i(t)
Dxi(h
(N)
i +
1
T
g
(N)
i )(X¯). (2.20)
This is known as the BRS, as described in [17–19] and given by Definition 2.1. In simulations, the
dynamics given by substituting (2.20) into the discretised version of (2.1) would be calculated
and the new state X(t+ ∆t) would be used to repeat the process. If we now let ∆t→ 0, we get
the following dynamics
dXi(t) =
(
f
(N)
i (X(t))−
1
αi(t)
Dxi(h
(N)
i +
1
T
g
(N)
i )(X(t))
)
dt+ σ(t,Xi(t))dBi(t)
Xi(0) = Xi,0.
(2.21)
Method 2:
This method uses the well know fact (see [23] or [40] for example) that Vi(t, x) solves the following
HJB equation for every i = 1, . . . , N .
sup
ui∈Rd
{
αi(t)
2
|ui|2+h(N)i (x) + ∂tVi(t, x)+
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
(
f
(N)
j (x) + u
∗
j
)
·DxjVi(t, x) +
(
f
(N)
i (x) + ui
)
·DxiVi(t, x)
+
1
2
N∑
j=1
Tr
(
σ2(t, xj)D
2
xjVi(t, x)
)}
= 0,
(2.22)
with Vi(T, x) = g
(N)
i (x)∀x ∈ Rd×N . Using first order conditions, we find that for every i =
1, . . . , N
u∗i = −
1
αi(t)
DxiVi(t, x). (2.23)
Substituting the above into (2.22), we obtain the following HJB equation and optimal agent
dynamics:
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12αi(t)
|DxiVi(t, x)|2 = h(N)i (x) + ∂tVi(t, x) + f (N)i (x) ·DxiVi(t, x)
+
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
(
f
(N)
j (x)−
1
αj(t)
DxjVj(t, x)
)
·DxjVi(t, x)
+
1
2
N∑
j=1
Tr
(
σ2(t, xj)D
2
xjVi(t, x)
)
(2.24)
dXi(t) =
(
f
(N)
i (X(t)−
1
αi(t)
DxiVi(t,X(t))
)
dt+ σ(t,Xi(t))dBi(t). (2.25)
Note that we still have the same terminal condition for the PDE for Vi and initial condition for
the SDE for Xi.
Now, using the MPC approach, we actually want to consider V ∆ti rather than Vi. We discretise
the analogue of (2.22) for V ∆ti (which is found by replacing h
(N)
i by
h
(N)
i
∆t ) in the time direction
only to get an order O(∆t) approximation of V ∆ti . This is a backward in time discretisation
since we are given a terminal condition. This results in the following equation
1
2αi(t+ ∆t)
|DxiV ∆ti (t+ ∆t, x)|2=
h
(N)
i (x)
∆t
+
V ∆ti (t+ ∆t, x)− V ∆ti (t, x)
∆t
+f
(N)
i (x) ·DxiV ∆ti (t+ ∆t, x)
+
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
(
f
(N)
j (x)−
1
αj(t)
DxjV
∆t
j (t+ ∆t, x)
)
·DxjV ∆ti (t+ ∆t, x)
+
1
2
N∑
j=1
Tr
(
σ2(t+ ∆t, xj)D
2
xjV
∆t
i (t+ ∆t, x)
)
.
(2.26)
Since we have V ∆ti (t+∆t, x) =
1
T g
(N)
i (x) for all x ∈ RN , this yields an orderO(∆t) approximation
V ∆ti (t, x) = (h
(N)
i +
1
T g
(N)
i )(x), which returns us to (2.20) and (2.21). Thus we can conclude that
the BRS can be derived from an MPC approach for stochastic differential games either through
the discretisation of the value function or through the discretisation of the corresponding HJB
equation.
2.3 Deriving the BRS dynamics for the limit N →∞
We now look at the limiting behaviour of equation (2.21) as N → ∞. First, we shall make the
following assumptions on the symmetry of f
(N)
i , h
(N)
i and αi, in order to pass to the limit as
N →∞ in a coherent manner. Similar such assumptions are made throughout MFG literature,
c.f. [8, 10,13,14,16,22,28]. The assumptions are:
A f
(N)
i (x) = f(xi,m
N
−i) for some f : R
d×P(Rd) → Rd, where P(R) is the set of Borel
probability measures on Rd and mN−i = 1N−1
∑N
j=1, j 6=i δxj .
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B Using the same notation, h
(N)
i (x) = h(xi,m
N
−i) for some h : R
d×P(Rd) → R. As a direct
consequence, Dxih
(N)
i (x) = Dxh(xi,m
N
−i), similarly for g
(N)
i .
C In order to ensure we can use symmetry arguments later in this paper, we require αi(t) =
α(t) for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Using assumptions A, B and C, equation (2.21) can be rewritten as
dXi(t) =
(
f(Xi(t),M
N
−i(t))−
1
α(t)
Dx(h+
1
T
g)(Xi(t),M
N
−i(t))
)
dt+ σ(t,Xi(t))dB
i
t. (2.27)
Here, MN−i(t) =
1
N−1
∑N
j=1, j 6=i δXj(t). We also require growth assumptions to apply results
relating to the limit of this SDE as N → ∞ as well as for existence and uniqueness later. The
assumptions made are
D For every i = 1, . . . , N X0i , as defined in (2.1) are i.i.d. random variables with distribution
m0 ∈ P2(Rd).
E There exists some constants C1 > 0 such that for any (x1,m1), (x2,m2) ∈ Rd×P(Rd), we
have |f(x1,m1)− f(x2,m2)|≤ C1(|x1 − x2|+d1(m1,m2)).
F There exists some constant C2 > 0 such that for any (x1,m1), (x2,m2) ∈ Rd×P(Rd), we
have |Dxh(x1,m1)−Dxh(x2,m2)|≤ C2(|x1 − x2|+d1(m1,m2)), and similarly for Dxg.
G There exists some constant C3 > 0 such that for any (t1, x1), (t2, x2) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd, we have
|σ(t1, x1)− σ(t2, x2)|≤ C3(|t1 − t2|+|x1 − x2|).
Here, d1(m1,m2) is the 1-Wasserstein distance, see Appendix A for further information on the
Wasserstein distance and the space of probability measures. Under the assumptions D, E, F
and G, trivial modifications to theorem 1.3 in [31] and theorem 1.4 in [42] show that for every
i = 1, . . . , N , X
(N)
i (t) converges as N →∞ (uniformly in t and i) in any compact interval [0, T ]
in the L2 sense to the following McKean-Vlasov equation.
dXt =
(
f(Xt,mt)− 1
α(t)
Dx(h+
1
T
g)(Xt,mt))
)
dt+ σ(t,Xt)dB(t),
Xt=0 = X0
(2.28)
where mt is the law of Xt, Bt is a d-dimensional Wiener process and X0 is an m0-distributed
independent random variable. Such behaviour, of particles in large systems behaving indepen-
dently of one another, is known as the propagation of chaos. Together, [42] and [31] effectively
cover existence and uniqueness of such SDEs. In fact, they have shown that for such SDEs strong
existence and uniqueness holds under the assumptions on f , Dxh, Dxg and σ already made. It is
often also of interest to understand how the entire population of players develops over time. To
do this, we will describe the evolution of the distribution of the population by analysing the weak
form of a pde for measures. For more information on differentiability in the space of measures,
see Appendix A.
Let φ ∈ C∞c ([0, T ]× Rd) be any test function, here φ ∈ C∞c ([0, T ]× Rd) is the set of compactly
supported, infinitely differentiable functions from [0, T ]× Rd to R. By Itoˆ’s formula we have
10
φ(t,Xt) = φ(0, X0)
+
∫ t
0
[
∂sφ(s,Xs) +Dxφ(s,Xs) ·
(
f(Xs,ms)− 1
α(s)
Dx(h+
1
T
g)(Xs,ms)
)]
ds
+
1
2
∫ t
0
Tr
(
σ2(s,Xs)D
2
xφ(s,Xs)
)
ds+
d∑
k=1
∫ t
0
∂xkφ(s,Xs)σkk(s,Xs)dBk(s).
(2.29)
We can then take the expectation, and use the boundedness of φ together with the Lipschitz
properties of the other functions to bring the expectation inside the integral via the dominated
convergence theorem, so we have
E[φ(t,Xt)]− E[φ(0, X0)]−
∫ t
0
E[∂sφ(s,Xs)] =
=
∫ t
0
E
[
Dxφ(s,Xs) ·
(
f(Xs,ms)− 1
α(s)
Dx(h+
1
T
g)(Xs,ms)
)]
ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[
1
2
Tr
(
σ2(s,Xs)D
2
xφ(s,Xs)
)]
ds.
(2.30)
Finally, we can use the definition of ms as the law of Xs and evaluate the expectations. This
gives the weak form of the following PDE that mt must satisfy
∂tmt = Dx ·
[(
1
α(t)
Dx(h+
1
T
g)(x,mt)− f(x,mt)
)
mt
]
+
1
2
Tr
(
D2x(σ
2(t, x)mt)
)
mt=0 = m0
(2.31)
3 Relating the BRS to MFGs
The aim of this section is to demonstrate how the BRS is linked to MFGs and to begin demon-
strating the extent of the simplification made in the BRS
3.1 Mean field limit of the HJB equation
We will now analyse the limiting behaviour of the HJB equation (2.24). To this end we require
that assumptions A, B,C, D, E and F all hold. In order to describe the limiting case, we need
to consider a function W = W (t, x, Y ) : [0, T ] × Rd×Rd(N−1) → R, as in [16], which we may
relate to Vi.
Lemma 3.1. Assume there exists a function W = W (t, x, Y ) : [0, T ] × Rd×Rd(N−1) → R that
is C1 in t, C2 in x and C2 in Y and which satisfies
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(3.1a)
1
2α(t)
|DxW (t, x, Y )|2 = h(x,mY ) + ∂tW (t, x, Y ) + f(x,mY )DxW (t, x, Y )
+
N−1∑
j=1
(
f(yj ,mY xj )−
1
α(t)
DxW (t, yj , Y
x
j )
)
·DyjW (t, x, Y )
+
1
2
N−1∑
j=1
Tr
(
σ2(t, yj)D
2
yjW (t, x, Y )
)
+ Tr
(
σ2(t, x)D2xW (t, x, Y )
)
(3.1b)W (T, x, Y ) = g(x,mY ),
where mY =
1
N−1
∑N−1
j=1 δyj and Y
x
k = (y1, . . . , yk−1, x, yk+1, . . . , yN−1). Then Vi, satisfying
(2.5) has a mean field limit W(t, x,m) : [0, T ] × Rd×P(Rd) → R. That is, denoting Vi by V Ni
to emphasise the dependence on N , if mX
∗
⇀ m as N → ∞ then V Ni (t,X) → W(t, xi,m) as
N →∞. Furthermore, W satisfies the following PDE in the weak sense
1
2α(t)
|DxW(t, x,m)|2=h(x,m) + ∂tW(t, x,m)
+ f(x,m) ·DxW(t, x,m) + 1
2
Tr
(
σ2(t, x)D2xW(t, x,m)
)
+
∫
Rd
(
f(y,m)− 1
α(t)
DxW(t, y,m)
)
· ∂mW(t, x,m)(y)m(dy)
+
1
2
∫
Rd
Tr
(
σ2(t, y)Dy [∂mW(t, x,m)] (y)
)
m(dy),
W(T, x,m) = g(x).
(3.2)
See Appendix A for more information on differentiation with respect to measures.
Proof. Let’s assume W satisfies (3.1), then we can define
Vi(t,X) = W (t, xi, X−i), (3.3)
where X ∈ RdN , X−i ∈ Rd(N−1). Then the partial derivatives of Vi satisfy
DxiVi(t,X) = DxW (t, xi, X−i)
∂tVi(t,X) = ∂tW (t, xi, X−i)
DxjVj(t,X) = DxW (t, xj , X−j)
DxjVi(t,X) = DyjW (t, xi, X−i)
D2xjVi(t,X) = D
2
yjW (t, xi, X−i)
D2xiVi(t,X) = D
2
xW (t, xi, X−i).
Using the above identities along with assumptions A and B, it is clear that W (t, xi, X−i) is
a solution to (2.24). Therefore, we no longer have to concern ourselves with studying the N
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equations of (2.24) for i = 1, . . . , N . Instead we can look at the behaviour of (3.1), as in [16], in
particular we can look at the limiting case of (3.1) as N →∞. Note that since f , g and h only
depend on the empirical distribution of Y , the solution, W , to (3.1) will also only depend on the
empirical distribution of Y . Thus, there exists a function W : [0, T ]×Rd×P(Rd)→ R such that
W (t, x, Y ) = W(t, x,mY )
The partial derivatives of W , and hence Vi, can also be seen as partial derivatives of W. We
have
1
2α(t)
|DxW (t, x, Y )|2 = 1
2α(t)
|DxW(t, x,mY )|2
∂tW (t, x, Y ) = ∂tW(t, x,mY )
σ2(t, x)D2xW (t, x, Y ) = σ
2(t, x)D2xW(t, x,mY ).
We now have two remaining terms to consider, namely
C1 =
N−1∑
k=1
(
f(yk,mY xk )−
1
α(t)
DxW (t, yk, Y
x
k )
)
·DykW (t, x, Y ) (3.4)
C2 = 1
2
N−1∑
j=1
Tr
(
σ2(t, yj)D
2
yjW (t, x, Y )
)
(3.5)
It is possible to modify Proposition 6.1 in [11] in order to rigorously express each of the terms
through derivatives of the mean field limit W. Using this proposition, the following identities
hold:
DxW (t, yk, Y
x
k ) = DxW(t, yk,mY xk ) (3.6)
DykW (t, x, Y ) =
1
N − 1∂mW(t, x,mY )(yk) (3.7)
D2yjW (t, x, Y ) =
1
(N − 1)2 ∂
2
mW(t, x,mY )(yj , yj) +
1
N − 1Dy [∂mW(t, x,mY )] (yj) (3.8)
In the above, ∂2mW := Dy
δ
δm (∂mW), see [11] and Appendix A for further information on
differentiability in the space of measures. Placing these identities into (3.4) – (3.5) and simplifying
using the definition of mY we get
C1 = 1
N − 1
N−1∑
k=1
(
f(yk,mY xk )−
1
α(t)
DxW(t, yk,mY xk )
)
· ∂mW(t, x,mY )(yk) (3.9)
C2 = 1
2(N − 1)
∫
Rd
Tr
(
σ2(t, y)∂2mW(t, x,mY )(y)
)
mY (dy)
+
1
2
∫
Rd
Tr
(
σ2(t, y)Dy∂mW(t, x,mY )(y)
)
mY (dy)
(3.10)
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We are now in a position to take the limit N →∞. First we assume that mY ∗⇀m as N →∞.
In this case, it is a matter of computation to show, for any φ ∈ C∞c (Rd), there exists an  > 0
such that
∣∣∣∣∫
R
φ(z)(mY xk −m)(dz)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∫
R
φ(z)(mY −m)(dz)
∣∣∣∣+ 1N − 1 |φ(x)− φ(yk)| < . (3.11)
Hence, mY xk
∗
⇀ m as N →∞ as well. So, finally we find the mean field equation for W(t, x,m)
to be
1
2α(t)
|DxW(t, x,m)|2=h(x,m) + ∂tW(t, x,m)
+ f(x,m) ·DxW(t, x,m) + 1
2
Tr
(
σ2(t, x)D2xW(t, x,m)
)
+
∫
Rd
(
f(y,m)− 1
α(t)
DxW(t, y,m)
)
· ∂mW(t, x,m)(y)m(dy)
+
1
2
∫
Rd
Tr
(
σ2(t, y)Dy [∂mW(t, x,m)] (y)
)
m(dy),
W(T, x,m) = g(x).
(3.12)
3.2 Mean field limit of the player dynamics
Now that we have seen the mean field limit of the HJB equation, this needs to be married to the
mean field limit of the player dynamics (2.1) with the optimal control, given by (2.23).
Lemma 3.2. Under assumptions A–F and the assumptions of Lemma 3.1, then for every i ∈
{1, . . . , N}, Xi satisfying (2.1) converges to a random process satisfying the following McKean-
Vlasov equation as N → ∞ (uniformly in t and i) in any compact interval [0, T ] in the L2
sense.
dXt = (f(Xt,mt)− 1
α(t)
DxW(t,Xt,mt))dt+ σ(t,Xt)dBt.
Xt=0 = X0
(3.13)
Here, Bt is a d-dimensional Wiener process, mt is the law of Xt and X0 is an independent
random variable with law L(X0) = m0, where m0 is the limit as the number of players goes to
infinity of the law of Xi,0 in the finite-agent case.
Remark. In a similar way to (2.31), it is possible to go from (3.13) to the following continuity
equation for mt:
∂tmt = Dx ·
[(
1
α(t)
DxW(t, x,mt)− f(x,mt)
)
mt
]
+
1
2
Tr
(
D2x(σ
2(t, x)mt)
)
mt=0 = m0.
(3.14)
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Proof. In light of the assumptions in Lemma 3.1, and following the previous section’s definition
of W(t, x,m), the dynamics of the N-player game can be reformulated as
dXi(t) = (f(Xi(t),m
N
−i(t))−
1
α(t)
DxW(t,Xi(t),m
N
−i(t)))dt+ σ(t,Xi(t))dB
i
t
Xi(0) = Xi,0.
(3.15)
Here, mN−i(t) =
∑N
j=1, j 6=i δXj(t) and for every i = 1, . . . , N , Xi,0 is an i.i.d. random variable with
disribution m0. Using the propagation of chaos, as in Section 2.1, and assumptions A–F, we can
conclude the result.
3.3 The mean field equation
Now that we have, by (3.14) and (3.2), the mean field limits of the player dynamics and HJB
equation, we want to find how the HJB equation changes along characteristics governed by the
mean field player dynamics. The following theorem describes that.
Theorem 3.3. Let’s define
w(t, x) := W(t, x,mt), (3.16)
where mt is satisfies (3.14). Then w(t, x) satisfies the following mean field PDE
1
2α(t)
|Dxw(t, x)|2= h(x,mt) + ∂tw(t, x) + f(x,mt) ·Dxw(t, x) + 1
2
Tr
(
σ2(t, x)D2xw(t, x)
)
,
w(T, x) = g(x).
(3.17)
This system together with (3.14) then fully describe the mean field limit of the dynamics of the
N -player stochastic differential game
Remark. With this theorem, we have also described the system that corresponds to -Nash
equilibria of the N -player game (2.1) (see e.g. [10] for how solutions to the mean field game
correspond to Nash equilibria of the finite-player game).
Proof. Our first step is to describe ∂tw(t, x). Note that
∂tw(t, x) =
d
dt
W(t, x,mt) = lim
h→0
W(t+ h, x,mt+h)−W(t, x,mt)
h
. (3.18)
Adding and subtracting W(t+ h, x,mt), we get
∂tw(t, x) = ∂tW(t, x,mt) + lim
h→0
W(t+ h, x,mt+h)−W(t+ h, x,mt)
h
. (3.19)
Following the method of (25) in [11], we get
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W(t+h, x,mt+h)−W(t+h, x,mt) =
∫ 1
0
∫
Rd
δW
δm
(t+h, x, (1−s)mt+smt+h)(y)(mt+h−mt)(dy)ds.
(3.20)
Using (3.14), with a test function φ(y) := δWδm (t+h, x, (1−s)mt+smt+h)(y), we see (3.20) leads
to
W(t+ h, x,mt+h)−W(t+ h, x,mt) =
=
∫ 1
0
∫ t+h
t
∫
Rd
1
2
Tr(
(
σ2(τ, y)D2y
δW
δm
(t+ h, x, (1− s)mt + smt+h)(y)
)
mτ (dy)dτds
+
∫ 1
0
∫ t+h
t
∫
Rd
(
f(y,mτ )− 1
α(τ)
DxW(τ, y,mτ )
)
·
·
(
Dy
δW
δm
(t+ h, x, (1− s)mt + smt+h)(y)
)
mτ (dy)dτds
(3.21)
We now divide by h, take the limit h→ 0 and, noting ∂mW := Dy δWδm , we get
∂tw(t, x) = ∂tW(t, x,mt) +
∫
Rd
(
f(y,mt)− 1
α(t)
DxW(t, y,mt)
)
· ∂mW(t, x,mt)(y)mt(dy)
+
1
2
∫
Rd
Tr
(
σ2(t, y)Dy[∂mW(t, x,mt)](y)
)
mt(dy).
(3.22)
We can therefore substitute this into (3.2) to obtain (3.17)
So, being able to solve (3.14) and (3.17) gives a solution along characteristics for W. This
corollary summarsises the result
Corollary 3.4. Provided assumptions A – F and the assumptions in Lemma 3.1 hold, the mean
field limit of the HJB equation governing the stochastic differential game (2.1), along with the
evolution in time of the distribution of agents is given by
1
2α(t)
|Dxw(t, x)|2= h(x,mt) + ∂tw(t, x) + f(x,mt) ·Dxw(t, x) + 1
2
Tr
(
σ2(t, x)D2xw(t, x)
)
,
(3.23)
∂tmt = Dx ·
[(
1
α(t)
Dxw(t, x)− f(x,mt)
)
mt
]
+
1
2
Tr
(
D2x(σ
2(t, x)mt)
)
, (3.24)
with initial and terminal conditions:
w(T, x) = g(x) (3.25)
mt=0 = m0. (3.26)
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Equation (3.23) describes the evolution (backwards in time) of an individual agent’s expected
cost, while (3.24) describes the evolution (forwards in time) of the distribution of all agent in the
state space.
3.4 The mean field BRS for the MFG system of equations
Having calculated the mean field equations in the previous section, we now use the MPC approach
to obtain the mean field BRS from the MFG and find that it matches (2.31). Clearly, in terms
of numerical calculations, it is much simpler to use the best reply strategy dynamics, (2.31)
as an approximation to (3.23) and (3.24) rather than try to solve these two equations directly.
This section will show that the BRS is indeed a simplification of (3.23) and (3.24) using MPC
methods.
Theorem 3.5. Define V ∆ti (t, x) by
V ∆ti (t, x) = min
ui∈A
E
[∫ t+∆t
t
(
αi(s)
2
|ui|2+ 1
∆t
h
(N)
i (X(s))
)
ds+
1
T
g
(N)
i (X(t+ ∆t))
]
, (3.27)
where X(s) solves (2.1) with controls
u∗i = arg min
ui∈A
E
[∫ t+∆t
t
(
αi(s)
2
|ui|2+ 1
∆t
h
(N)
i (X(s))
)
ds+
1
T
g
(N)
i (X(t+ ∆t))
]
, (3.28)
and X(t) = x. Then the HJB equation associated with V ∆ti has a mean field limit
1
2α(t)
|Dxw(t, x)|2= h(x,mt)
∆t
+ ∂tw(t, x) + f(x,mt) ·Dxw(t, x) + 1
2
Tr
(
σ2(t, x)D2xw(t, x)
)
,
w(t+ ∆t, x) =
1
T
g(x),
(3.29)
the solution of which can be approximated up to an error of order O(∆t) by
w∆t(t, x) = (h+
1
T
g)(x,mt). (3.30)
The corresponding law of motion for the distribution of players in the mean field limit is therefore
given (up to an error of order O(∆t)) by
∂tmt = Dx ·
[(
1
α(t)
Dx(h+
1
T
g)(x,mt)− f(x,mt)
)
mt
]
+
1
2
Tr
(
D2x(σ
2(t, x)mt)
)
mt=0 = m0.
(3.31)
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Proof. First note that the HJB equation ssociated with V ∆ti has a mean field limit w
∆t, as defined
by Theorem 3.3, and it satisfies (3.31). Following a method similar to Method 2 in Section 2.2,
we assume we have a solution of w and m at time t and we are interested in understanding the
solution at a time in the future t+ ∆t, for small ∆t. Setting T = t+ ∆t and discretising (3.23)
backwards in time we get, up to an error of order O(∆t)
1
2α(t+ ∆t)
|Dxw(t+ ∆t, x)|2 = h(x,mt+∆t)
∆t
+
w(t+ ∆t, x)−w(t, x)
∆t
+ f(x,mt+∆t) ·Dxw(t+ ∆t, x)
+ Tr
(
σ2(t+ ∆t, x)D2xw(t+ ∆t, x)
)
.
(3.32)
Then, using the terminal condition for w∆t we get, up to an error of order O(∆t)
w∆t(t, x) = (h+
1
T
g)(x,mt). (3.33)
Substituting this into the mean field equation for m gives, up to an error of order O(∆t)
∂tmt = Dx ·
[(
1
α(t)
Dx(h+
1
T
g)(x,mt)− f(x,mt)
)
mt
]
+
1
2
Tr
(
D2x(σ
2(t, x)mt)
)
mt=0 = m0.
(3.34)
Remark. It is interesting to note that the mean field dynamics found here are the same as those
for the controlled dynamics in Subsection 2.2. Thus we can conclude that the best reply strategy
for the mean field stochastic differential game can be derived by either first applying the MPC
method to the N-player game and then taking the mean field limit, or by first taking the mean
field limit of the N-player game and then applying the MPC method.
4 Applications
In this section we will take some examples from the MFG and BRS literature and use the
paradigm of this paper to compare the two approaches.
4.1 Wealth distribution driven by local Nash equilibria
This example is taken from [17]. Their model described the evolution of agents’ wealth and
economic configuration (which was noted in [17] as possibly being a diverse number of attributes,
from social status to education level depending on the situation) in time as a response to trading
between agents. The trading was assumed to depend on the difference in wealth between two
agents that want to trade, and has its origins in [9], as well as later work by [21]. In this model, we
assume d = 2, since we are considering agents are described firstly by their wealth and secondly
by their economic configuration, so in our framework we have
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Xi(t) = (Yi(t), Zi(t)).
Here, Yi is agent i’s economic configuration and Zi is their wealth. It is assumed that there is
no debt in this model, hence Zi > 0 for all i. They are governed by the following system of
equations
dYi
dt
= v(Xi(t)) (4.1)
dZi(t) = ui(t)dt+
√
2dZi(t)dBi(t). (4.2)
Notice that the first equation is deterministic and can not be explicitly controlled, whereas the
second equation has a control ui but no deterministic movement otherwise. v describes the speed
at which an agent’s economic configuration evolves. Now, we introduce the following notation,
similar to notation at the beginning of Section 2.2, Y (t) = (Yi(t))i, Y−i(t) = (Yj(t))j 6=i, and
similarly for Z, Z−i. The value functional is given by
V ∆ti (t, x) = E
[
1
∆t
∫ t+∆t
t
∆tu2i
2
+ Φ(N)(X(s))ds
]
X(t) = x,
Φ(N)(x) =
1
N
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
ξi,j(y)Ψ(|yi − yj |)φ(zi − zj).
(4.3)
In [17] it is explained that φ is the trading interaction potential, i.e. it governs the amount
of trading that occurs between any two agents based on their difference in wealth. It is also
explained that ξi,j(Y (s))Ψ(|Yi(s)− Yj(s)|) is the trading frequency, i.e. the rate at which trades
or movement of wealth takes place between two agents, determined by how far apart the agents’
economic configuration is. Several assumptions are made on each of the functions in 4.3. First,
we assume that the function φ : R→ R is C2 and an even function. Second, we assume ξij = ξji
and that it is dependent on the number of other agents in a neighbourhood of the economic
configuration of agents i and j. As in [17], we assume ξij has the following form
ξij(y) = ξ
(
ρΨi + ρ
Ψ
j
2
)
, ρΨi =
N∑
l=1, l 6=i
Ψ(|yj − yl|). (4.4)
Since each agent can only control their Yi variable, the HJB equation is modified to
(∂ziV
∆t
i )
2
2
=
Φ(N)(x)
∆t
+ ∂tV
∆t
i + v(xi)∂yiV
∆t
i
+
N∑
j=1j 6=i
(v(xj)∂yjV
∆t
i + ∂zjVj∂zjV
∆t
i ) +
N∑
j=1
dz2j ∂zjzjV
∆t
i .
(4.5)
This is generally an extremely difficult equation to solve and so, although the optimal control is
given by u∗i (t, x) = ∂ziV
∆t
i (t, x), the best reply strategy of u
∗
i (t, x) = − 1N
∑N
j=1, j 6=i ξi,j(y)Ψ(|yi−
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yj |)φ′(zi − zj), is a much more tractable and realistic suggestion for how wealth may really be
moved.
The mean field limit
Under the framework of this paper, assumptions A and C are automatically fulfilled. It is also
relatively straightforward to notice that
Φ(N)(x) =
∫
R2
ξ
(
ρψN (yi)− ρψN (y′)
2
)
Ψ(|yi − y′|)φ(zi − z′)mN−1−i (dx′), (4.6)
where ρψN (yj) =
∑N
l=1, l 6=j Ψ(|yj − yl|) =
∫
R2 Ψ(|yj − y′|)mN−1−j (dx) for any j = 1, . . . , N and
mN−1−i =
∑N
j=1, j 6=i δxj . So, with a trivial modification that doesn’t affect the convergence,
assumption B is also satisfied. Similarly, we can ensure assumptions D, E and F are satisfied
as long as we assume Ψ and v are both Lipschitz. So under these relatively weak assumptions
we find that in the mean field limit, with individuals using the BRS, Xi(t) → Xt for every
i = 1, . . . , N who’s distribution evolves according to the following Fokker-Planck equation
∂tmt = −∂y(v(x)mt) + ∂z(∂zΦ(x,mt)mt) + d∂zz(z2mt),
mt=0 = m0.
(4.7)
Here Φ(x,m) =
∫
R2 ξ
(
ρψ(y,m)−ρψ(y′,m)
2
)
Ψ(|y − y′|)φ(z − z′)m(dx′) and ρψ(y,m) = ∫R2 Ψ(|y −
y′|)m(dx′). This is supplemented with various boundary conditions in [17] to close the PDE
problem. Equation (4.7) is also an order O(∆t) approximation of the full mean field game below,
where w∆t is the mean field limit of V ∆ti , as described in section 3.3.
∂tmt = −∂y(S(x)mt) + ∂z(∂zw(t, x)mt) + d∂zz(z2mt),
mt=0 = m0.
(4.8)
(∂yw
∆t(t, x))2 + (∂zw
∆t(t, x))2 =
Φ(x,mt)
∆t
+ ∂tw
∆t(t, x) + S(x)∂yw
∆t(t, x) + 2dz2∂zzw
∆t(t, x)
w(T, x) = 0.
(4.9)
It is clear that either solving (4.7) numerically, or analytically showing that solutions do exist is
a much simpler problem than solving the full mean field equations related to the fully optimal
solution.
4.2 Congestion and aversion in pedestrian crowds
This second example has been taken from [34]. In the paper, the authors begin with an overview
of the different methods for modelling traffic and pedestrian dynamics, followed by a description
of how mean field games may be used as a bridge from microscopic traffic models to macroscopic.
The paper then continues by describing an MFG model of pedestrian traffic. This model is
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perfectly suited to adapting to a BRS approach, firstly because the cost function implemented
by [34] can be adapted to the approach taken in this paper, and secondly because it is natural to
imagine that individuals in a crowd don’t optimise their own behaviour based on the long-term
future behaviour of other individuals around them, as described by the complex MFG framework.
Rather, an assumption that individuals look at the flow around them at an almost instantaneous
moment in time and change their behaviour accordingly seems to fit more naturally to our lived
experience and is best described through the BRS framework.
The paper [34] considers two populations of groups, their analysis begins with assuming the mean
field limit has been taken and that in this limit, the distribution of each group is absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. We can modify our analysis from Section
2.1 to accomodate these ideas. We begin by considering two populations of individuals, with
distribution functions m1(t, x) and m2(t, x) respectively. The respective positions in space Rd of
a representative particle are given by Y (t) and Z(t). They move according to the following SDE
dY (t) = α(t)dt+ σdB1(t) (4.10)
dZ(t) = β(t)dt+ σdB2(t). (4.11)
In (4.10)–(4.11), α and β are the controls of the populations, σ ∈ diag(Rd) is a diagonal positive
matrix, and B1 and B2 are independent d-dimensional Brownian motions. As in [34], we focus
on the two populations interacting on some domain Ω ⊂ R2. The cost function being optimised
by each representative player is given by
Vλ(t,m1,m2) = E
[∫ T
t
( |α(s)|2
2
+ Φλ(Y (s),m1(s),m2(s))
)
ds+ Ψ1(Y (T ))
]
(4.12)
Wλ(t,my,mz) = E
[∫ T
t
( |β(s)|2
2
+ Φλ(Z(s),m2(s),m1(s))
)
ds+ Ψ2(Z(T ))
]
(4.13)
(Y (t), Z(t)) ∼ (m1(t),m2(t)). (4.14)
Using the formulation of Φ in [34], it can be consistently defined to match the framework of this
paper by
Φλ(x,mi,mj) = mi(x) + λmj(x), λ > 0. (4.15)
Here, [34] described λ as the ’xenophobia parameter’, that is it measures how averse each group
is to one another. If λ is high then the two groups will separate as much as possible, whereas if
λ is low, the groups will be as or more worried about their distance between individuals in the
same group than those in the opposite group. Equations (4.10) — (4.14) are formulated in the
following mean field game system in [34]
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∂tm1 =
1
2
Tr
(
σ2D2xm1
)
+Dx · (DxVλm1) (4.16)
∂tm2 =
1
2
Tr
(
σ2D2xm2
)
+Dx · (DxWλm2) (4.17)
|DxVλ|2
2
= ∂tVλ +
1
2
Tr
(
σ2D2xVλ
)
+ Φ(x,m1,m2) (4.18)
|DxWλ|2
2
= ∂tWλ +
1
2
Tr
(
σ2D2xWλ
)
+ Φ(x,m2,m1). (4.19)
Under the paradigm of this paper, we consider that in fact in each interval [t, t+ ∆t] agents are
minimising the following cost with respect to a fixed (in time) control random variable.
V ∆tλ (t,m1,m2) = E
[∫ t+∆t
t
( |α(s)|2
2
+
1
∆t
Φλ(Y (s),m1(s),m2(s))
)
ds+
1
T
Ψ1(Y (t+ ∆t))
]
(4.20)
W∆tλ (t,my,mz) = E
[∫ t+∆t
t
( |β(s)|2
2
+
1
∆t
Φλ(Z(s),m2(s),m1(s))
)
ds+
1
T
Ψ2(Z(t+ ∆t))
]
(4.21)
(Y (t), Z(t)) ∼ (m1(t),m2(t)).
(4.22)
Using the best reply strategy approach, we are able to simplify this system to the following two
equations, which describe the evolution of the two populations.
∂tm1 =
1
2
Tr
(
σ2D2m1
)
+D · ((Dm1 + λDm2 + 1
T
DΨ1)m1) (4.23)
∂tm1 =
1
2
Tr
(
σ2D2m2
)
+D · ((Dm2 + λDm1 + 1
T
DΨ2)m1). (4.24)
This section has clearly shown some of the potential benefits of using the BRS to replace MFGs
in certain situations, of course when exactly this is appropriate requires further investigation.
However, it is intuitive from the formulation of the BRS that in situations where short time
horizons are considered and agents are unable to optimise their behaviour efficiently then there
is a case for using the BRS.
5 Conclusion and future perspectives
In conclusion, we have shown that the BRS, a sub-optimal strategy for players in a stochastic
differential game, can be derived from the optimal strategy as an asymptotic limit of a revised
cost functional. The BRS is an important alternative strategy to the MFG to consider when the
time horizon of the optimisation problem is small because it depends only on the running and
terminal costs. As a result there is no HJB equation to solve, and since the HJB equation is often
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intractable the BRS offers a more tractable modelling approach and at reduced computational
effort. We then showed how, under certain conditions, the BRS can produce a mean field limit
as the number of players tends to infinity. To close our analysis, we proved that the mean
field game equations first introduced by Lasry and Lions [37], which are the mean field limit
of the stochastic differential game, can also be approximated by the BRS. We concluded that
regardless of whether we approximate the MFG by the mean field BRS, or approximate the
N -player stochastic differential game by the BRS first and then take the mean field limit, the
resulting dynamics of the distribution of players is the same.
In the final section we were able to analyse two examples from existing literature. In the first, the
BRS was already used as the dynamics for the mean field behaviour, so we can now justify this use
by explaining that the agents involved in the behaviour approximately minimise a related cost.
In the second example, we show how a mean field game for congestion could be approximated by
using the BRS. This simplified the behaviour considerably and could allow us to computationally
model the behaviour more efficiently. We have a number of future directions.
Throughout the paper we have had to renormalise the optimisation problem to obtain the BRS
as an approximation to a solution to the game. We have not claimed that the resulting BRS
will now approximate the MFG solution for the original optimisation problem. In fact, one can
imagine situations where the BRS will be qualitatively similar to the MFG and situations where
they won’t. We hope to explore more direct comparisons between MFG and BRS dynamics in
future work.
Appendix
A Differentiability in the space of measures
In this section, we will outline some key definitions and results about the space of measures, and
in particular differentiability in the space of measures. This material is not new and is sourced
from [5,10,11,20]. Throughout this section, (E, d) will be any complete separable metric space, µ
and ν will be probability measures on (E, d) and Γ(µ, ν) := {γ ∈ P(E2) : ∀A ∈ B(E), γ(A×E) =
µ(A) and γ(E × A) = ν(A)}, where P(E) is the set of probability measures on E and B(E) is
the Borel sigma algebra on E.
Definition A.1. For any p ≥ 1, the set of probability measures of order p, denoted by Pp(E) ⊂
P(E), is the set of µ ∈ P(E) such that for any y ∈ E
∫
E
(d(x, y))pµ(dx) <∞.
Definition A.2. Let µ, ν ∈ Pp(E) and let p ≥ 1. The p-Wasserstein distance between µ and ν,
denoted by Wp(µ, ν) is defined as
Wp(µ, ν) = inf
γ∈Γ(µ,ν)
{[∫
E2
(d(x, y))pγ(dx, dy)
]1/p}
.
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With this distance defined, Pp(E) is a metric space. Definitions A.1 and A.2 can be equivalently
reformulated in terms of random variables as follows. We now let (Ω,F ,P) be an atomless
probability space.
Remark. Definitions A.1 and A.2 can be restated in a complementary form using random vari-
ables. For example Pp(E) can be defined as the set of µ ∈ P(E) such that for any y ∈ E and
any random variable X : Ω→ E with law L(X) = µ
E[(d(X, y))p] <∞
.
Similarly, Wp(µ, ν) can be defined as
Wp(µ, ν) = inf
{
E[(d(X,Y ))p]1/p : L(X) = µ, L(Y ) = ν
}
.
The reason for defining Pp(E) and Wp in this alternative way is that it is often easier to work
with random variables than it is to work with measures directly. It is important to note that
since E is a Polish space (complete and separable) and Ω is atomless, it is always possible to
find such an X with law L(X) = µ. Now that we have put a metric space structure onto the
set of probability measures, the next step is to define differentiability of functions with respect
to measure. There are several overlapping, but not equivalent, definitions of differentiability in
the space of measures. In this appendix we will discuss L-differentiability, as defined in [20],
and the notion of a functional derivative described in [11]. There is also another definition of
differentiability, defined in [5], which is in some sense a more intrinsic definition of differentiability
however it is less useful to us here and so will be ignored in this appendix. For this section of the
appendix, as with the main body of the paper, we will restrict our analysis to focussing on P2(Rd).
We will focus on functions u : P2(Rd) → R and consider their lift u˜ : L2((Ω,F ,P);Rd) → R
defined by u˜(X) = u(L(X)). As previously discussed, it is always possible to find such a random
variable X given a measure µ.
Definition A.3. Let u and u˜ be as defined above. u is (continuously) L-differentiable at µ ∈
P2(Rd) if there exists a random variable X ∈ L2((Ω,F ,P);Rd) such that u˜ is differentiable in the
usual Fre´chet sense atX (or continuously differentiable in an open neighbourhood ofX in the case
of continuously L-differentiable). Note that in this case, we consider Du˜(X) ∈ L2((Ω,F ,P);Rd)
by associating this space with its dual.
It is not clear straight away that the above definition of differentiability is independent of the
choice of X, however the next two propositions (to be found, along with proofs, in [20]) show that
this is indeed the case and, under certain circumstances the derivative can be uniquely described
by the measure µ.
Proposition A.4. Let u and u˜ be as defined previously. Suppose u is L-differentiable at µ ∈
P2(Rd). Then, for all X ∈ L2((Ω,F ,P);Rd) such that L(X) = µ, u˜ is differentiable at X and
the law of (X,Du˜(X)) is independent of the X chosen so that L(X) = µ.
Proposition A.5. Let u and u˜ be as defined previously. Suppose u is everywhere continuously
L-differentiable. Then, for every µ ∈ P2(Rd), there exists a deterministic, measurable function
ξ : Rd → Rd such that for all X ∈ L2((Ω,F ,P);Rd) with L(X) = µ we have Du˜(X)(ω) =
ξ(X(ω)) for almost every ω ∈ Ω.
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The importance of these two propositions, as explained in [20], are as follows. Proposition
A.4 means that differentiability with respect to a measure µ depends only on µ and not on the
particular random variable chosen to represent the derivative. Proposition A.5 states that if there
is some further regularity in the differentiability, then not only is the L-derivative independent of
the random variable, it is of the form ξ(X) for some deterministic function ξ which is uniquely
defined almost everywhere. Due to this uniqueness property, we can then define the L-derivative
of u as follows
Definition A.6. Let u and u˜ be as defined previously. Suppose u is continuously L-differentiable
and ξ is as in Proposition A.5. Then, the L-derivative of u at µ ∈ P2(Rd), denoted by ∂mu(µ) is
defined as the equivalence class of ξ in L2((Rd, µ);Rd). This is defined uniquely since ξ is defined
uniquely almost everywhere with respect to µ.
Note that since ∂mu(µ) is an equivalence class of functions from Rd to Rd, it can be identified
with a function ∂mu(µ)(·) : Rd → Rd without ambiguity. We shall often consider ∂mu(µ) in such
a way without explicit reference to this form. As mentioned near the beginning of this appendix,
the notion of the functional derivative of a function with respect to a measure will also be a
widely used notion for us in this paper. We will now define what this notion is and link it to the
previous definition of the L-derivative. The following definition is attributed to [11].
Definition A.7. Let u : P2(Rd) → Rd. We call u a C1 function if there exists some function
δu
δm : P2(Rd)× Rd → Rd such that for all µ, ν ∈ P2(Rd) the following holds.
lim
s→0+
u((1− s)µ+ sν)− u(µ)
s
=
∫
Rd
δu
δm
(µ)(y)(ν − µ)(dy). (A.1)
Here, δuδm (µ) is defined up to a constant, so the normalisation condition
∫
Rd
δu
δm (µ)(y)µ(dy) = 0
is taken. The requirement (A.1) can easily be seen as equivalent to the following requirement,
which is the requirement used in Section 3.3.
u(ν)− u(µ) =
∫ 1
0
∫
Rd
δu
δm
(sν − (1− s)µ)(y)(ν − µ)(dy)ds.
These two notions of derivative have a simple relationship to each other, as explained in Propo-
sitions A.8 and A.9 below (see [11] and [20] respectively for original statements and proofs).
Proposition A.8. Let u : P2(Rd) → R be C1. Assume further that the function δuδm (µ)(·) :
Rd → Rd is continuously differentiable for any µ ∈ Rd. Then u is L-differentiable and we have
∂mu(µ)(x) = Dx
δu
δm
(µ)(x). (A.2)
Proposition A.9. Let u : P2(Rd) → R be L-differentiable. Assume further that the Fre´chet
derivative of u˜ is Lipschitz and that for all µ ∈ P2(Rd) there is a representative ∂mu(µ)(·) such
that ∂mu : P2(Rd)× Rd → Rd is continuous. Then u is C1 and satisfies (A.2)
In Section 3 and in particular Section 3.3, we rely heavily on this functional derivative notion,
and implicitly use Propositions A.8 and A.9 to interchange the definitions.
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